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Attack graphs provide compact representations of the attack paths an attacker can follow to compromise
network resources from the analysis of network vulnerabilities and topology. These representations are a
powerful tool for security risk assessment. Bayesian inference on attack graphs enables the estimation of
the risk of compromise to the system’s components given their vulnerabilities and interconnections, and
accounts for multi-step attacks spreading through the system. Whilst static analysis considers the risk pos-
ture at rest, dynamic analysis also accounts for evidence of compromise, e.g. from SIEM software or forensic
investigation. However, in this context, exact Bayesian inference techniques do not scale well. In this pa-
per we show how Loopy Belief Propagation - an approximate inference technique - can be applied to attack
graphs, and that it scales linearly in the number of nodes for both static and dynamic analysis, making such
analyses viable for larger networks. We experiment with different topologies and network clustering on syn-
thetic Bayesian attack graphs with thousands of nodes to show that the algorithm’s accuracy is acceptable
and that it converges to a stable solution. We compare sequential and parallel versions of Loopy Belief Prop-
agation with exact inference techniques for both static and dynamic analysis, showing the advantages and
gains of approximate inference techniques when scaling to larger attack graphs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite significant efforts to protect networks against cyber-attacks [Gartner, Inc.
2014], system administrators cannot cope with the sophistication of modern threats,
as shown by the history of breaches that organizations have suffered in recent years
[Lord 2015]. One of the most common strategies to protect networks is to identify and
patch vulnerabilities. However, this is often not systematically done, either for lack of
resources or because it requires interrupting critical systems. A risk-driven approach
is therefore needed to optimise resources for network protection. Such an approach
requires assessing the networks risks, prioritizing the most critical threats, and then
estimating the risk exposure, given the likelihood of threats and the severity of the
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impacts [Wheeler 2011]. Finally, these values are used by administrators to select ap-
propriate countermeasures. But often this analysis is carried out separately for each of
the network components ignoring interdependencies between vulnerabilities, i.e. how
successfully exploiting a vulnerability allows an attacker to exploit other vulnerabili-
ties, thus moving across the network and acquiring privileges at every step.
These shortcomings can be addressed using Attack Graphs (AGs) [Sheyner et al.
2002; Ammann et al. 2002], a well-established technique to represent the possible
paths of an attacker through the system by exploiting successive vulnerabilities. AGs
allow system administrators to reason about threats and risks in a formal way to better
select countermeasures [Ingols et al. 2009]. Two types of analysis can be performed.
Static analysis determines the a priori risks to which network components are ex-
posed.Dynamic analysis updates those risks in light of any indication that some of the
network components may have been compromised, e.g. from Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Dynamic analysis
also allows administrators to profile the attacker’s paths, to determine the nodes that
are more likely to be attacked in the next steps and evaluate the security risk when
we observe evidence of an ongoing attack. As organizations are often under attack,
dynamic analysis gives administrators important insights on the most vulnerable tar-
gets and where they should spend their efforts at run-time. Although several metrics
have been proposed to perform security risk assessment using AGs [Wang et al. 2007a;
2007b], taking into consideration the length and the number of paths that let the at-
tacker reach a goal, or the global impact of the existing vulnerabilities in the network,
they fail to consider the difficulty of exploiting each vulnerability and the dependencies
between the different attack paths. In this sense, it is easy to observe that both static
and dynamic analysis of AGs have inherent probabilistic characteristics given the un-
certainty about the attackers’ ability to successfully exploit vulnerabilities. Therefore,
considering the dependencies between vulnerabilities, Bayesian Networks (BNs) pro-
vide an appropriate framework to model AGs [Liu and Man 2005; Frigault et al. 2008].
They depict causal relationships between random variables in a compact way, so they
can model the uncertainty about the attacker’s behaviour and capabilities.
Bayesian Attack Graphs (BAGs) can be analysed through efficient algorithms, such
as Variable Elimination or Junction Tree (JT), to make exact inference, i.e. to compute
the unconditional probabilities of all the nodes in the BAG, i.e. the probabilities that an
attacker can reach the different security states in the AG [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016].
However, computing these probabilities is known to be an NP-Hard problem [Cooper
1990], and this limits the applicability of exact inference techniques to medium-size
graphs (in the order of 100-1,000 nodes), especially when the structure of the graph
is dense [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016]. However, empirical investigations show that
networks are highly complex: estimates of mean corporate network size are in the
order of thousand of nodes [Sharma et al. 2011; Raftopoulos and Dimitropoulos 2013].
Moreover, each host may have somewhere between 2 and 11 vulnerabilities according
to [WhiteHat Security 2015]. For example, Websites are reported to have an average
of 6.5 vulnerabilities [Symantec 2015]. Thus, exact inference techniques can be very
slow and computationally very expensive for such complex networks, especially for
the dynamic analysis of BAGs. For this reason, simpler metrics, computationally less
demanding, have been proposed for tractable analysis of AGs in real networks [Idika
and Bhargava 2012; Noel and Jajodia 2014]. However, these metrics do not consider
the dependencies between vulnerabilities.
To sidestep this limitation we propose to use approximate inference techniques to
allow to analyse AGs in larger networks in a tractable way. Although approximate
inference in BNs is also NP-Hard [Koller and Friedman 2009], inference algorithms,
such as Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP) [Pearl 1988], have better scalability than ex-
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act inference techniques. We should not be deterred by the “approximation” involved
in this context for two reasons. First, because the probabilities are used for priori-
tising threats, so even if significant differences between them are meaningful, their
absolute or accurate values are relatively less important. Second, because the prob-
ability of successful exploitation of a vulnerability is already a rough estimate, often
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [Common Vulnerability
Scoring System, V3 2016; Frigault et al. 2008; Poolsappasit et al. 2012], which ignores
other factors such as attacker’s skills, knowledge and tooling and, hence, may not be
an accurate indication of compromise per se. Therefore, notwithstanding their inher-
ent approximation, the scalability of these algorithms makes them crucial to perform
qualitative risk analysis of large networks. Although the validity of the results is lim-
ited by the errors in the estimates of the probabilities, in our experimental evaluation
we show that the accuracy of the probability estimates provided by LBP is reasonable
for static and dynamic risk analysis and mitigation using BAGs.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
—We have proposed a revised BAG model from those described in [Liu and Man 2005;
Frigault et al. 2008; Poolsappasit et al. 2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016] consider-
ing a non-perfect behaviour in the IDS and the possible presence of zero-day vulner-
abilities. We describe how to compute the conditional probability tables taking into
account these two factors and show their effect on the unconditional and posterior
probabilities compared to the ideal case.
—To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the use of approximate
inference techniques for the scalable analysis of AGs. Furthermore, we propose and
compare both the sequential and parallel implementations of LBP to estimate the
probabilities of compromise for the network nodes.
—We provide a comprehensive experimental evaluation using synthetic AGs which em-
ulate the complexity of real scenarios. These experiments allow us to assess the ap-
plicability of sequential and parallel implementations of LBP for the analysis of AGs
with thousands of nodes, and show the limitations of existing exact inference ap-
proaches, such as the JT algorithm [Shenoy and Shafer 1990].
—We show through experiments that LBP scales linearly in the number of nodes for
both static and dynamic analysis of BAGs, which contrasts with the exponential scal-
ability of exact inference (e.g. JT) in some cases, especially when the AG is dense. The
experiments further show that the accuracy of LBP is sufficient for many practical
needs exhibiting a rooted mean squared error smaller than 0.03.
—Finally, we show that it is possible to get accurate results before the LBP algorithm
fully converges, by allowing administrators to monitor the probability estimates at
each iteration, and enabling them to start planing risk mitigation strategies in ad-
vance. This is not possible with exact inference techniques.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we discuss the related work.
In Sect. 3 we introduce our Bayesian AGmodel, including an example of a small typical
corporate network as a use case. The use of Belief Propagation and LBP for the analy-
sis of BAGs is described in Sect. 4. We discuss the Junction Tree algorithm proposed in
[Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016] in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6 we present the experimental results
for the static and dynamic analysis of synthetic AGs. Finally, in Sect. 7 we present the
main conclusions and our plans for further work.
2. RELATED WORK
AGs are graphical models that represent the knowledge about network vulnerabilities
and their interactions, showing the different paths an attacker can follow to reach a
given goal by exploiting a set of vulnerabilities. Along each attack path, vulnerabilities
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are exploited in sequence, so that each successful exploit gives the attacker more pri-
vileges towards his goal. In the literature of AGs we can distinguish two main types of
representations, namely state-based and logical AGs.
State-based representations of AGs [Jha et al. 2002; Phillips and Swiler 1998;
Sheyner et al. 2002; Sheyner and Wing 2004; Swiler et al. 2001] result in directed
graphs, where each node represents the state of the whole network after a success-
ful atomic attack. This approach suffers from a combinatorial explosion of the graph
when increasing the number of nodes and vulnerabilities in the network. Moreover,
these graphs contain duplicate attack paths that differ only in the order of the at-
tack steps, which also increase the complexity of the graph, limiting the applicability
of state-based representations to very small networks [Ammann et al. 2002; Jajodia
et al. 2005; Ou et al. 2006].
The scalability problems of state-based representations are overcome with logical
AGs, which are bipartite graphs that represent dependencies between exploits and
security conditions [Ammann et al. 2002; Jajodia et al. 2005]. These representations
rely on the monotonicity principle: the attacker never relinquishes privileges once ob-
tained. Although not always applicable, this assumption is reasonable in most cases,
as discussed in [Ammann et al. 2002]. Monotonicity allows to remove duplicated paths
and to generate AGs that grow polynomially with the number of vulnerabilities and
the number of connected pairs of hosts [Albanese et al. 2012].
AGs are a powerful tool to perform risk assessment and different metrics have been
proposed in the literature. [Lippmann et al. 2006] propose to use the percentage of net-
work assets an attacker has compromised. However, this metric is not goal-oriented,
as it is the case of AGs. [Pamula et al. 2006] propose the weakest adversary metric,
i.e. the measure of the risk according to the weakest attack path in the graph. Simpler
approaches are used in [Phillips and Swiler 1998; Ortalo et al. 1999; Li and Vaughn
2006], where they propose to use the shortest path, the number of paths, and the av-
erage path length as metrics to measure risk. In a similar way, [Idika and Bhargava
2012] propose the normalized mean, standard deviation, mode, and median of the path
lengths as a set of metrics to assess risk in AGs. [Noel and Jajodia 2014] propose a met-
rics suite for AGs that takes into account the CVSS scores of the vulnerabilities in the
AGs as well as topological aspects of the graph, such as the connectivity, the number
of cycles, and the depth. However, most of these metrics fail to account for the depen-
dencies of the vulnerabilities and attack paths, as well as the difficulty to exploit the
vulnerabilities. These limitations can be addressed with probabilistic models, which
allow to compute the probabilities of each node in the graph to be compromised by an
attacker when the network is at rest or under attack.
Other security metrics have also been proposed to evaluate the risk of zero-day vul-
nerabilities: [Wang et al. 2014] introduce k-zero day safety, a security metric to assess
the impact of zero-day vulnerabilities taking into account how many vulnerabilities
would be required for compromising network assets. Following a similar spirit, [Zhang
et al. 2016] propose to use network diversity as a security metric to evaluate the re-
silience of networks w.r.t. zero-day attacks. The authors define different metrics based
on the effective number of distinct resources and diversity metrics based on attacking
efforts. From a different perspective, [Bilge and Dumitras 2012] present a empirical
analysis of the impact of zero-day attacks based on the collection of real data.
Beyond standard risk assessment with AGs, [Albanese et al. 2011] introduce attack
scenario graphs, which combine AGs with dependency graphs. The latter representa-
tions capture the dependencies across network components and services. Attack sce-
narios allows to provide more comprehensive risk assessment taking into account both
the vulnerabilities present on the network and the services running.
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Probabilistic models for AGs have been already proposed in the literature: For ex-
ample, [Liu and Man 2005; Frigault et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2008] present mecha-
nisms to calculate the conditional probability tables, which represent the probabilities
of compromising a node given all possible states of the parent nodes (or preconditions).
However, no mechanism is proposed to calculate the unconditional probabilities, i.e.
the probabilities of compromising the nodes in the network regardless of the state
of their corresponding preconditions. A more complete Bayesian model is described in
[Xie et al. 2010], which takes into account non-perfect behaviour of the alert correlation
system and the impact of zero-day vulnerabilities. However, no inference technique is
proposed to calculate the unconditional probabilities and the experimental evaluation
does not show the applicability of their model to networks of different sizes and the
impact of having zero-day vulnerabilities and non-perfect IDS.
Several techniques have also been proposed in the literature for exact inference on
BAGs. For example, forward-backward propagation is proposed in [Poolsappasit et al.
2012] to compute the unconditional probabilities. However, this procedure is only valid
for chains [Rabiner and Juang 1986; Murphy 2012] and cannot be applied to general
AGs. [Liu and Man 2005] propose to use Variable Elimination (VE) [Dechter 1996] for
exact inference on BAGs. Although this is an efficient technique, it is highly dependent
on the heuristic for the elimination ordering and no heuristic is suggested in [Liu and
Man 2005]. Furthermore, none of these papers reports an experimental evaluation of
the time and memory required by the techniques proposed to assess their suitability
for static and dynamic analysis of AGs. More recently, the JT algorithm was proposed
in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016] for exact inference in BAGs. This technique allows
to efficiently compute the exact unconditional probabilities by using a probabilistic
message passing scheme. The experimental evaluation shows the advantages of JT
over VE in terms of the time and the memory required. However, the applicability of
JT to large networks is limited, especially when the AGs are dense.
3. BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPHS
In this section we propose a BAG model similar to the ones proposed in [Liu and Man
2005; Poolsappasit et al. 2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016] but relaxing some of their
assumptions to consider the effect of zero-day vulnerabilities and to model the non-
perfect behaviour of the IDS. Thus, we first describe the general background on BAGs
and the assumptions we are considering in our revised model. Then, we describe how
to compute the conditional probability tables needed to make inference on the BAG
model for the static and the dynamic analysis. We also discuss the impact of zero-day
vulnerabilities and non-perfect IDS on the computation of the probabilities. Finally, we
show an example of our proposed BAG model on a synthetic example representative of
a small corporate network.
3.1. Background
Some of the literature on AG analysis assumes that monotonicity induces a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) structure of logical AGs [Liu and Man 2005; Poolsappasit et al.
2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016]. Although monotonicity helps to get rid of many
directed cycles related to duplicate attack paths (that appear in state-based represen-
tations) some directed cycles still remain. However, [Wang et al. 2008] explain how
to handle and eliminate directed cycles without loss of integrity. In this paper, we con-
sider AGs with a DAG structure. Where directed cycles appear, we refer to [Wang et al.
2008] to build the corresponding conditional probability tables in the nodes affected by
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the cycle. The DAG structure1 of logical AGs and the uncertainty about the attacker’s
behaviour and capabilities, make BNs a suitable alternative to model AGs and perform
static and dynamic analysis. In particular, BNs allow to calculate the probability of an
attacker reaching a security condition (state) in the AG.
Definition 3.1. A Bayesian Network (BN) is a directed acyclic graphical model
where the nodes represent random variables and the directed edges represent the de-
pendencies between random variables. Let X = {X1, ..., Xn} be a set of (continuous or
discrete) random variables. The joint probability distribution can be written as:
p(X) =
n∏
i=1
p(Xi|pai) (1)
Then, under the BN representation, for each nodeXi there is a directed edge from each
node in pai, the set of parents nodes of Xi, pointing to Xi.
In the context of the BAG, the nodes represent the different security states that
an attacker can reach. We model the behaviour of these states as Bernoulli random
variables. Hence, the probability of an attacker compromising a node Xi is Pr(Xi =
T) = p, whereas the probability of an attacker not compromising that node is Pr(Xi =
F) = 1 − p, with p ∈ [0, 1].2 The probabilities of an attacker successfully exploiting
a vulnerability, needed to compute the conditional probabilities p(Xi|pai) in (1), are
represented as parameters of the model, since these values varies slowly across time
(in the order of days or weeks).
3.2. Model Assumptions
In line with much of the related work [Liu and Man 2005; Frigault et al. 2008; Pool-
sappasit et al. 2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016], we make some assumptions in our
model, although we relax some constraints to model the non-perfect behaviour of the
IDS and the presence of zero-day vulnerabilities:
—We consider that the probability of successfully exploiting a single vulnerability does
not affect the probabilities that the attacker can successfully exploit other vulnera-
bilities. We also assume that these probabilities remain nearly constant in time. Al-
though in [Frigault et al. 2008] the dynamic aspects of vulnerabilities are modelled
with a Dynamic Bayesian Network, in practice changes to the probabilities typically
occur over periods of days or weeks. Therefore, we argue that it is better to recompute
the model when changes occur rather than to increase the complexity of the model to
include the dynamic aspects of these probabilities.
—We assume that the probability of successfully exploiting a vulnerability is the same
regardless of the attacker. However, these probabilities can be updated according
to other models that take into account the attackers’ capabilities and preferences.
For example, we can use different sets of AG parameters corresponding to different
attacker models identified as proposed in [Baiardi and Sgandurra 2013].
—We also assume that the topology of the network, host connectivity (including open
ports) and the set of vulnerabilities do not change during the dynamic analysis of the
BAG. This would require dynamic AG generation, which is out of the scope of this
paper. However, if existing vulnerabilities are patched at run-time, our BAG repre-
sentation can be easily updated by setting the probability of successful exploitation
1Note that, although we do not consider directed cycles, there are still (non-directed) loops in the AG for this
logical representation of AGs.
2To simplify the mathematical notation we will refer to the unconditional probability of a node to be com-
promised as Pr(Xi) instead of Pr(Xi = T)
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of the patched vulnerabilities to zero. On the contrary, if new vulnerabilities are dis-
covered or new nodes are added to the network, a new AG needs to be generated.
3.3. Conditional Probability Tables
The information available at each node Xi in a BAG is the conditional probability
distribution p(Xi|pai), the probability of a node to be compromised given the state of
its parent nodes pai. Thus, these conditional probabilities represent the probabilities
of an attacker reaching a security state Xi given the observations of its preconditions
pai and the vulnerabilities vi that can be exploited to compromiseXi. In this sense, we
consider that the probabilities of successfully exploiting vulnerabilities are parameters
of the BAG model that are used to calculate p(Xi|pai).
A common approach to estimate pvi , the probability of an attacker successfully ex-
ploiting a vulnerability vi, is based upon CVSS [Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys-
tem, V3 2016]. Although CVSS scores are intended to estimate the impact of a vulner-
ability rather than its average probability of being successfully exploited, CVSS scores
(or some of their submetrics) are often used in the literature to estimate pvi [Frigault
et al. 2008; Poolsappasit et al. 2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016]. In this sense, the
exploitability submetric of CVSS can be considered more appropriate to estimate pvi ,
since it tries to measure the difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability.
Given an estimate of the probabilities of exploitation of the vulnerabilities that allow
an attacker to reach a security state Xi from states pai, we consider two possible cases
to build the conditional probability tables [Poolsappasit et al. 2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez
et al. 2016]: AND and OR conditional probability tables. In the first case, all the pre-
conditions need to be satisfied to be able to compromise Xi, i.e. the attacker needs to
compromise all the nodes in pai before being able to perform an attack to compro-
mise Xi. In the case of OR conditional probability tables, the attacker only needs to
compromise one of the nodes in pai to attempt an attack to reach the security state Xi.
Considering that the alert system is not perfect and that there can be zero-day vul-
nerabilities, we introduce a leak factor, pl, which we describe in Sect. 3.6, to consider
these aspects. Then, AND conditional probability tables can be calculated as:
p(Xi|pai) =
{
pl, ∃Xj ∈ pai|Xj = F
1− (1− pli) (1−
∏
j:Xj
pvj ), otherwise
(2)
whereas for OR conditional probability tables, using the noisy-OR formulation [Koller
and Friedman 2009], we have:
p(Xi|pai) =
{
pl, ∀Xj ∈ pai|Xj = F
1− (1− pli)
∏
j:Xj
(1 − pvj ), otherwise
(3)
The leak factor pli in (2) and (3) models the cases where, even when all the parent
nodes are in the False state (those parent nodes have not been compromised), there
is still some (non-zero) probability of Xi taking the True state. The reason for this is
that the IDS system may have triggered a false alarm or Xi has been compromised
because there is a zero-day vulnerability that allows the attacker to compromise Xi.
In Sect. 3.6 we give more details about the effect of pli . By combining (2) and (3) we can
extend the construction of conditional probability tables to intermediate cases, where
different subsets of preconditions need to be satisfied before trying to compromise Xi.
3.4. Prior on the Attacker’s Initial State
In AG representations, there is usually a leaf node representing the initial state of the
attacker when the attacker has not compromised any node in the network yet. Follow-
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ing the model in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016], we consider that this node is not really
a random variable, since it only represents that the attacker has full rights on his
own machine. Under the Bayesian representation, we can consider that the Bernoulli
random variable X0 representing the initial state of the attacker has Pr(X0) = 1. Al-
though [Poolsappasit et al. 2012] propose to use this initial node to reflect some subjec-
tive prior knowledge of the attacker capabilities (by letting the administrator set the
value of Pr(X0)), this can lead to misleading conclusions, especially when reasoning
using new evidence about the nodes that an attacker may have already compromised,
as discussed in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016]. Finally, we can break loops in the BN by
instantiating one initial node for each possible initial attack path. This does not affect
the value of the unconditional probabilities of the rest of the nodes but can favour the
convergence and the accuracy of LBP estimates [Murphy et al. 1999].
3.5. Static and Dynamic Analysis of the BAG
For the static analysis of AGs, i.e. considering the network at rest, we are interested
in calculating the unconditional probability distributions p(Xi), rather than p(Xi|pai).
Thus, p(Xi) corresponds to the probability of an attacker reaching a given security
condition and, hence, is an indicator of the risk. Using Bayes rule, it is possible to
calculate p(Xi) from the product of conditional probability distributions:
p(Xi) =
∑
X−Xi
p(X) =
∑
X−Xi
n∏
j=1
p(Xj |paj) (4)
whereX−Xi indicates that we sum over all the set of random variables X except Xi.
These probabilities can be used as risk estimates to detect weak areas in the network
and serve as an input for network hardening or static risk mitigation techniques [Noel
et al. 2003; Albanese et al. 2012].
In contrast, for the dynamic analysis of AGs, given evidence of attacks on a set
of nodes Xe, e.g. through SIEM alerts, we need to compute the posterior probability
p(Xi|Xe), i.e. the probability of an attacker compromising the node Xi given that we
have observed evidence of attack at nodesXe. Again, using Bayes rule, we can compute
this posterior distribution from the joint probability distribution:
p(Xi|Xe) =
p(Xi,Xe)
p(Xe)
=
∑
X−{Xi,Xe}
p(X)∑
X−Xe
p(X)
(5)
These posterior probabilities provide a re-estimation of the risk at run-time and can
help system administrators to apply security measures to contain an ongoing attack
or to protect some valuable network resources. In this sense, [Poolsappasit et al. 2012]
propose a model for dynamic risk mitigation with the probabilities provided by a BAGs
by formulating a discrete reasoning problem solved using a genetic algorithm.
The exact calculation of (4) and (5) is an NP-Hard problem [Koller and Friedman
2009]. Thus, applying brute force and computing the joint probability distributions
to make inference in probabilistic graphical models is not a reasonable approach in
terms of computational time and memory. Efficient algorithms, such as Variable Elim-
ination (VE) [Dechter 1996] or Junction Tree (JT) [Shenoy and Shafer 1990; Shafer
and Shenoy 1990], are necessary even for small graphs. However, the applicability of
these techniques is limited, especially when the graphs are dense, demanding a lot of
memory to compute the unconditional probabilities. Even when the structure of BAGs
is expected to have some special properties, given the network structure and the num-
ber of vulnerabilities, there are no guarantees about the computational complexity for
exact inference techniques. In these cases, approximate inference is a reasonable alter-
native to enable a tractable estimation of the unconditional and posterior probabilities.
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Although approximate inference in BNs is also NP-Hard [Koller and Friedman 2009],
efficient techniques like LBP [Pearl 1988] allow to efficiently estimate the uncondi-
tional and the posterior probabilities in (4) and (5) for large networks. In Sect. 4 we
describe how to use LBP for the analysis of BAG.
3.6. Zero-day Vulnerabilities and Non-perfect IDS
Estimating the error probability, pe, of the alert correlation system is difficult due to
the dynamic aspects of the system behaviour. In this sense, several approaches esti-
mate this error probability based on ad hoc methodologies and test the system under
particular conditions [Milenkoski et al. 2015]. More recently, [Juba et al. 2015] propose
a novel approach to evaluate alert correlation systems providing statistical guarantees
on the measured performances. Although this is still an open research problem, even
a rough estimate of this error probability can be useful to provide better risk assess-
ments with BAGs.
Estimating the probability of having a zero-day vulnerability being successfully ex-
ploited by an attacker, pzi (to gain privileges in node Xi), is even more challenging
that the previous case and goes beyond the intention of this paper, since it clearly
requires a much more detailed treatment and modelling. However, we think that an
approach similar to the estimation of the probability of successful exploitation of vul-
nerabilities, by means of CVSS scores, can be achieved by using the CommonWeakness
Scoring System (CWSS) [Common Weaknesses Scoring System 2014] which provide a
quantitative measure of the unfixed weaknesses present in a software application. For
example, in the Environmental metric we have the Likelihood of Discovery and the
Likelihood of Exploitwhich estimate, respectively, the likelihood of an attacker discov-
ering the weakness in the software and the likelihood that, if discovered, the attacker
can successfully exploit them. Though these submetrics can be useful for the estima-
tion of the probability of successful exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, there are
some aspects that should be further considered. CWSS scores are associated with a
software application, whereas the nodes in the BAG model represent security condi-
tions. Thus, we need a mechanism to aggregate the scores from the software running
in the machines associated to a particular security condition in the BAG. Moreover, we
should also consider the preconditions that should be met before the attacker can ex-
ploit some weaknesses. This can be modelled by considering the Attack Surfacemetric
in the CWSS score through the Required Privilege and Required Privilege Layer sub-
metrics, which identify the type of privileges and the operational layer to which the
attacker must have privileges before he can exploit the software weakness.
The estimation of the probability of an attacker successfully exploiting a zero-day
vulnerability should be something particular to each node in the BAG, rather than
setting a unique value for all the nodes. This is motivated from the differences in the
software running in the different nodes of the network and because of the precondi-
tions the attacker should meet before exploiting a zero-day vulnerability. Therefore,
we can expect that the preconditions needed to compromised a node in the BAG close
to the target are more difficult to obtain than the preconditions to compromise one of
the initial nodes in the BAG. The reason is that these preconditions of nodes close to
the target are usually postconditions of longer attack paths, so they should reflect the
accumulated efforts along the paths. On the other hand, we can think of an extension
of the traditional AG model to consider potential attack paths that can be followed by
an attacker exploiting some unknown vulnerabilities by combining the analysis of soft-
ware vulnerabilities with the reachability information. Then, we can consider some of
the submetrics of CWSS scores, such as the Required Privilege and the Required Priv-
ilege Level to model the preconditions, and the Acquired Privilege and the Acquired
Privilege Level (from the Base Finding metric) to model the postconditions. The inclu-
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sion of these potential attack paths in the AG representation, which are aligned with
the framework proposed in [Wang et al. 2014], is a matter for further consideration.
For the sake of simplicity, in the remaining of this paper we will consider that we
already know the error probability of the IDS, pe, and the probabilities of an attacker
successfully exploiting a zero-day vulnerability for all the nodes in the BAG, pzi . Then,
we can compute the leak pl, used in (2) and (3) to model the uncertainty introduced by
the non-perfect IDS and the presence of zero-day vulnerabilities, as:
pli = 1− (1− pe)(1− pzi) (6)
In [Poolsappasit et al. 2012] the authors suggest to introduce a leak to consider zero-
day vulnerabilities, letting the system administrator to model this parameter, but they
do not describe how to recompute the conditional probability tables using the leak.
Moreover, using a global parameter to estimate the effect of zero-day vulnerabilities is
not the best strategy. A different approach is proposed in [Xie et al. 2010], where a leak
is introduced in the calculation of the conditional probability tables to model zero-day
vulnerabilities. The non-perfect behaviour of the IDS is modelled by introducing an
extra node in the BAG to model the observation of the current state of the node, which
depends on the actual state of the node. Although the proposed model considers the
two sources of uncertainty, the addition of one extra node for each node in the graph
increases the complexity of the graph, which can limit the application of their model
for large networks. In contrast, our approach does not introduce extra complexity in
the structure of the BAG, but only considers a correction factor pli when computing the
conditional probability tables, as shown in Sect. 3.3.
To illustrate the effect of the leak in the computation of the conditional probability
tables and the unconditional probabilities, in Fig. 1 and 2 we show a simple example
with three security states representing that the attacker has root privileges on hosts
1 and 2 (nodes A and B in the figures) and the goal of the attacker is to gain user
privileges in host 3 (node C). We consider that the probabilities of successful exploita-
tion for the vulnerabilities that can be exploited from A and B to compromise C are
0.8 and 0.4 respectively. In Fig. 1 we consider the OR case: only one of the precondi-
tions (A or B) is needed to compromise C, whereas in Fig. 2 we show the AND case:
the two preconditions should be met before compromising C. In Tables I and II we
detail the conditional probability tables for the OR and the AND cases respectively
computed in the ideal case (perfect IDS and no zero-day vulnerabilities) and in the
case where pe = 0.10 and pz = 0.05. In Tables I and II we can observe that in the real
case Pr(C = T) is higher for all the entries in the table.
In the OR case, in Table I we appreciate that when both A and B are false (i.e. not
compromised), there is still some probability that C can be compromised. This can be
due to the presence of a zero-day vulnerability or because the IDS missed an intrusion.
Similarly, in the AND case in Table II, when one of the preconditions is false, there is
still some chance of having C compromised for the same reason.
In Fig. 1.(a) we show the unconditional probabilities for the perfect and the real case.
As expected, the risk estimate in node C is higher in the real case. However, when
we observe evidence of compromise in node C, as shown in Fig. 1.(b), the posterior
probabilities on A and B for the perfect scenario are higher. This is due to the fact
that there are two more possible causes for observing evidence of attack in C (apart
of considering that A and B could have been compromised): an attacker exploited an
unknown vulnerability or the IDS triggered a false alarm.
Similarly, for the AND case, the unconditional probability of C, shown in Fig. 2.(a),
when no evidence of attack is observed, is higher for the real scenario, due to the po-
tential presence of zero-day vulnerabilities or because the IDSmissed some intrusions.
In Fig. 2.(b), when evidence of compromise is observed in C, as in the OR case, the pos-
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Table I. Conditional probability tables for and OR conditional probability
table for the ideal scenario and a case where the error probability of the
IDS is 0.10 and the probability of an attacker successfully exploiting a
zero-day vulnerability is 0.05.
PaC Perfect case Real case
A B Pr(C = T) Pr(C = F) Pr(C = T) Pr(C = F)
T T 0.880 0.120 0.897 0.103
T F 0.800 0.200 0.829 0.171
F T 0.400 0.600 0.487 0.513
F F 0 1 0.145 0.855
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. OR example: (a) Unconditional probabilities for the static analysis. (b) Posterior probabilities when
there is evidence of attack at node C (the attacker gets user access at machine 3).
Table II. Conditional probability tables for and AND conditional probabil-
ity table for the ideal scenario and a case where the error probability of
the IDS is 0.10 and the probability of an attacker successfully exploiting
a zero-day vulnerability is 0.05.
PaC Perfect case Real case
A B Pr(C = T) Pr(C = F) Pr(C = T) Pr(C = F)
T T 0.320 0.680 0.419 0.581
T F 0 1 0.145 0.855
F T 0 1 0.145 0.855
F F 0 1 0.145 0.855
terior probabilities on A and B for the real scenario are lower for the same reasons
than before.
Finally, in Fig. 3 we show the impact of the leak pl computed in (6) from pe and pz on
the unconditional probability on node C for the OR and AND cases. As we observe the
probability of compromising C significantly increases in both cases when increasing
pe and pz. Although in these simple examples, the increment of Pr(C) is nearly linear
w.r.t. pe and pz, the combination of the effects produced by the leaks included in the
calculation of the conditional probability tables can lead to a non-linear behaviour in
more general BAGs, as we will show in Sect. 3.7. Despite this consideration, it is clear
from Fig. 3 that the non-perfect behaviour of the IDS and the presence of zero-day
vulnerabilities can have a significant impact on the assessment of the risk. Thus, the
estimation of both pe and pz should be considered carefully, as we discussed before.
3.7. Example
In this subsection we show an example of analysis of a BAG in the scenario depicted
in Fig. 4, which represents a typical small corporate network. We will also use this
example to illustrate and explain the inference algorithms described in Sect. 4 and 5.
In detail, for the network in Fig. 4 we have an internal LAN for corporate employees,
and a DMZ hosting the company’s servers, namely, a public Web server, a Mail server,
and a local Database server (used to store public and private data). For each node,
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. AND example: (a) Unconditional probabilities for the static analysis. (b) Posterior probabilities when
there is evidence of attack at node C (the attacker gets user access at machine 3).
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Fig. 3. Values for the unconditional probability in node C, Pr(C), as a function of the error probability of
the IDS, pe, and the probability of having zero-day vulnerabilities, pz for (a) the OR case and (b) the AND
case.
we have indicated the set of reachable ports, and from which other nodes they are
reachable: this set includes those ports open/filtered by the firewall, as well as those
open/closed by local firewalls, switches, routers, etc. In addition, we have highlighted
some vulnerabilities that might be present on the network nodes. As an example, the
Web server can be accessed on port 80 and port 43 by any other node (and also from
the Internet), whereas it can be reached on port 22 (SSH server) only from the IP
addresses belonging to the “Admin PC” node in the LAN3. Further, we suppose this
node has a vulnerability affecting the SSH server (CVE-2015-6564). For each vulnera-
bility, we show in Fig. 4 over which port it can be exploited (in case the vulnerability
is a remote one), the CVE identifier, the type of vulnerability (DoS, elevation of priv-
ilege, etc.), and the likelihood of exploiting such a vulnerability. We have based this
likelihood on the CVSS Exploitability Subscore, which we have divided by 10. In our
particular example, when the corresponding score is 1.0, we have decided to lower the
value to 0.95, since a probability of successful exploitation of 1.0 means that the at-
tacker has already reached the next security state, without necessarily exploiting the
vulnerability, which is not true. Finally, we suppose that a generic attacker exists that
is willing to launch attacks from the Internet.
The BAG representation for this example is shown in Fig. 5. Following the guidelines
described before, we have two nodes A1 and A2 that represent the initial attacker’s
state for the two possible initial attack paths, and the final objective of the attacker is
to compromise the Database server (node F ). With these settings, the joint probability
for all the nodes in the BAG can be written as:
p(A1, A2, B, C,D,E, F ) = p(A1) p(A2) p(B|A1) p(C|A2) p(D|B,C) p(E|C) p(F |D,E) (7)
3If not explicitly indicated, it means that any other port is closed.
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Fig. 4. Example of a Small Network with one LAN, a Mail server, a Web server, and a Database server.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. BAG example for the network in Fig. 4: (a) Unconditional probabilities for the static analysis. (b)
Posterior probabilities when there is evidence of attack at the Mail Server.
In Fig. 5.(a) we show the result of the static analysis, where we are interested in
computing the unconditional probabilities when no evidence of attack is observed. In
this case, we observe that the Database server can be compromised with a probability
of 79.9% and that this high risk is due to the high probability of compromising the Mail
server.
An example of dynamic analysis of the BAG is shown in Fig. 5.(b), where we consider
that the alert correlation system triggers an alarm on the Mail server. For the sake
of clarity, we have considered here a perfect behaviour of the alert correlation system.
Fig. 5.(b) shows the posterior probabilities for all the network nodes given the evidence
of compromise at node D. As expected, we observe that the risk of compromising the
Database server increases to 84.8%. When reasoning about the potential attack path
allowing the attacker to compromise the Mail server, the posterior probability of both
nodes B and C is the same - in this example the paths are equally likely.
To illustrate the effect of the non-perfect behaviour of the IDS and the possibility
of having zero-day vulnerabilities, in Fig. 6 we show the unconditional probabilities
of compromising the Database server varying the error probability of the IDS, pe, and
the probability of an attacker successfully exploiting a zero-day vulnerability, pz, in
the interval [0, 0.5]. We have considered that the values of pe and pz are the same
for all the nodes in the BAG. This simple example shows that both pe and pz can
have a significant impact on the risk assessment. In our example the probability of
compromising the Database server increases to 98.3% when pe = 0.5 and pz = 0.5,
whereas the probability in a perfect scenario with pe = 0 and pz = 0 is 79.9%.
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Fig. 6. Values for the unconditional probability in node F, Pr(F ), as a function of the error probability of
the IDS, pe, and the probability of having zero-day vulnerabilities, pz.
D E Pr(F = T) Pr(F = F)
T T (0.96→) 0.80 (0.04→) 0.20
T F (0.80→) 0.00 (0.20→) 1.00
F T (0.80→) 0.80 (0.20→) 0.20
F F (0.00→) 0.00 (1.00→) 1.00
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. (a) Updated posterior probabilities when the vulnerability from the Mail Server to the Database
server has been patched in the BAG example in Fig. 5. (b) Updated conditional probability table for the
Database server after patching the vulnerability (we show the previous values for each entry in the table in
parentheses).
In Fig. 7.(a) we show the updated posterior probabilities when the system admin-
istrator has patched the vulnerability from the Mail Server to the Database Server.
Thus, the corresponding attack path has been removed in the BAG representation.
To recompute the posterior probabilities, we just need to update the conditional prob-
ability table for node F (the Database server) by considering that the probability of
successful exploitation of the vulnerability from the Mail Server is zero. In Fig. 7.(b)
we show the updated conditional probability table, which is equivalent to a condi-
tional probability table where F depends only on node E (the Web server). Thus, D
becomes a dummy variable for the computation of this conditional probability table,
i.e. p(F |D,E) = p(F |E). Finally, we recompute the posterior probabilities given the ev-
idence of attack in the Mail Server with an exact or approximate inference algorithms,
such as JT or LBP. As shown in Fig. 7, this countermeasure reduces significantly the
risk of the Database server being compromised from 84.8% to 24.2%. In the next section
we describe how these probabilities can be efficiently computed.
Although when patching a vulnerability we remove one or several attack paths from
the AG, we suggest that, instead of recomputing the whole BAG model removing the
corresponding attack paths, it is more efficient to set the probability of successful ex-
ploitation of the patched vulnerabilities to zero, which is equivalent to removing the
attack paths from the BAG, since the conditional probability tables are equivalent.
Thus, we do not recompute the whole model, but just update the corresponding pa-
rameters. This can be especially helpful when using JT for exact inference in BAGs,
since we do not need to compute the clique tree again each time we patch a vulner-
ability, which in some cases, can be computationally expensive. On the other hand,
our proposed approach copes with cases where a temporal countermeasure is applied,
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Fig. 8. Factor Graph representation for the BAG in Fig. 5 removing the attack path from the LAN admin
to the Mail server.
e.g. the system administrator blocks part of the traffic or shut down some services
temporarily to contain an ongoing attack.
4. SCALABLE INFERENCE ON BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPHS
In this section we introduce two efficient techniques to make inference in BAGs: Be-
lief Propagation (BP) and Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP). Both algorithms are based
on message passing schemes that allow to compute the unconditional probabilities of
the nodes in BNs or Markov Random Fields (MRFs). While BP is a method for exact
inference, it is restricted to tree or polytree graph structures. On the contrary, LBP is
an approximate inference technique that can be applied to graphs with loops.
4.1. Belief Propagation
As mentioned earlier, BP allows to compute the unconditional probabilities in a BN
or a MRF when the graph is a tree or a polytree [Pearl 1982; 1988]. Although this
structure is restrictive for AGs in general, BP can be applied for inference on Attack
Trees [Schneier 1999]. Furthermore, for graphs with a general structure we can use
the JT algorithm as an extension of BP, as we describe in Section 5. To describe the
BP algorithm, we introduce the concept of factor graphs using a formulation similar
to that given in [Bishop 2006]. BNs and MRFs allow to express the joint probability
distribution of a set of random variables as a product of factors over subsets of those
variables. Factor graphs make this factor decomposition explicit by introducing addi-
tional nodes for the factors themselves, in addition to those representing the variables,
thus resulting in bipartite graphs.
Referring to the example shown in Fig. 5, if we remove the attack path from the LAN
admin to the Mail server (for example, by patching the vulnerability), the resulting AG
is a tree and we can use BP for inference. For this reduced BAG, the joint probability
distribution can be factorised as:
p(A1, A2, B, C,D,E, F ) =
5∏
i=1
fi(Xi) (8)
where the corresponding factors fi(Xi) are:
f1(A1, B) = p(A1) p(B|A1)
f2(A2, C) = p(A2) p(C|A2)
f3(B,D) = p(D|B)
f4(C,E) = p(E|C)
f5(D,E, F ) = p(F |D,E)
(9)
Note that several factor graph representations may exist for a given BN (or MRF)
[Bishop 2006]. However, the selection of a specific representation does not significantly
impact the performance of BP. In our example, the corresponding factor graph accord-
ing to (9) is shown in Fig. 8.
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BP works by passing real valued functions, called messages, among the neighbour-
ing nodes in the graph. Since factor graphs are bipartite, there are two possible types
of messages: From variable to factor, and from factor to variable. The message from a
variable Xi to a factor fj in the neighbourhood of Xi is given by:
µXi,fj (Xi) =
∏
fk∈{Fi−fj}
µfk,Xi(Xi) (10)
where µfk,Xi(Xi) are the messages from the factor nodes in the neighbourhood of Xi
except fj . On the other hand, the message from a factor node fi to a variable node Xj
in the neighbourhood of fi is calculated as:
µfi,Xj (Xj) =
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs)
∏
Xk∈Xs
µXk,fj (Xk) (11)
whereXs is the set of variable nodes in the neighbourhood of fi except Xj.
When a variable Xi is a leaf node, the corresponding messages to the factors in its
neighbourhood are equal to one, i.e. µXi,fj (Xi) = 1. On the contrary, if a factor fi is a
leaf node, the message to a variable node in its neighbourhood is given by µfi,Xj (Xj) =∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs).
To compute the unconditional probabilities for all the nodes in the graph, BP needs
to compute all the messages from all node variables to their corresponding factors and
vice versa. BP proceeds starting from the leaf nodes (either variable or factor nodes)
and propagates the messages across the graph such that a variable node Xi cannot
send a message to a factor fj until Xi receives all messages from its neighbouring
factors except fj . The same applies when sending messages from factors to variable
nodes. For example, in the factor graph in (8), we cannot send a message from factor
f5 to variable F until f5 receives a message from variables D and E.
Once all messages are computed, the unconditional probability for a node Xi, when
the graph is a BN4, can be calculated as:
p(Xi) =
∏
fj∈Fi
µfj ,Xi(Xi) (12)
where Fi are the factor nodes in the neighbourhood ofXi. Therefore, BP can efficiently
calculate all the marginal probabilities by computing all the messages once and storing
them.
For the dynamic analysis, when we observe new evidence of compromise in some
nodes, we only need to recompute the factors that depend on the variables that have
changed in order to obtain the posterior probability on all the nodes of the network
given the evidence of compromise. Further details are explained in [Koller and Fried-
man 2009]. Finally, the details about the computational complexity of BP will be dis-
cussed in Sect. 5 along with the corresponding discussion for the complexity of JT, as
BP can be considered as a particular case of JT.
4.2. Loopy Belief Propagation
LBP is a simple extension of BP [Pearl 1988] applied to graphs (BNs or MRFs) that
contain loops5. The difference is that, in the presence of loops, the results of LBP are
approximate estimates of the unconditional probabilities of the nodes in the graph.
LBP uses the same factor graph representation as BP. In Fig. 9 we show the corre-
sponding factor graph representation for the BAG depicted in Fig. 5, where we observe
4For MRFs we need to include a normalization factor.
5In this context a loop is an undirected cycle.
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Fig. 9. Factor Graph representation for the BAG in Fig. 5.
that there is one loop due to the attack path from the LAN admin node to the Mail
server. The corresponding factors fi(Xi) are the same as in (9) except for f3, which in
this case also depends on variable C, so that f3(B,C,D) = p(D|B,C).
There are two possible implementations of LBP according to how messages are com-
puted, namely Sequential LBP (S-LBP) and Parallel LBP (P-LBP) [Murphy 2012] (they
sometimes are also referred as asynchronous and synchronous LBP respectively). For
S-LBP we iteratively compute the messages in (10) and (11) following some arbitrary
schedule, until the unconditional probability estimates obtained with (12) converge or
until a maximum number of iterations has been reached. Although there is no restric-
tion on the order in which we update the messages (10) and (11), and the beliefs (12),
depending on the structure of the graph, there are some scheduling techniques that
can be applied to favour convergence and reduce the time to achieve it [Koller and
Friedman 2009]. The detailed steps of the algorithm are shown in the Supplement.
In contrast, P-LBP updates all the messages for all factors and variable nodes at
the same time, using the values of the messages at the previous iteration. Thus, at
iteration t, we first update the messages from nodes to factors. The update equation
for the message from a node Xi to a factor fj can be written as:
µ
(t)
Xi,fj
(Xi) =
∏
fk∈{Fi−fj}
µ
(t−1)
fk,Xi
(Xi) (13)
In a second step we update the messages from factors to variable nodes where the
equation the message from factor fi to node Xj is given by:
µ
(t)
fi,Xj
(Xj) =
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs)
∏
Xk∈Xs
µ
(t)
Xk,fj
(Xk) (14)
Finally, we compute the new estimates of the marginal probabilities with (12) with
the updated messages obtained using (14). As in the previous case, the algorithm is
repeated until the unconditional probabilities converge or a maximum number of iter-
ations is reached. The details of P-LBP are shown in the Supplement.
For the first iteration in both S-LBP and P-LBP we initialize the messages from
nodes to factors to 1. The messages from a factor fi to a node Xj are initialized as
µfi,Xj (Xj) =
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs). The details of this procedure can also be found in the
Supplement.
According to [Koller and Friedman 2009], S-LBP usually works better than P-LBP,
although they require scheduling messages in a guided way. However, the experimen-
tal results on synthetic BAGs, presented in Sect. 6, show a similar behaviour for both
implementations in terms of accuracy.
In Fig. 10 we show the estimates for the unconditional probabilities in the BAG de-
picted in Fig. 5.(a) when there is no evidence of attack. It can be observed that there is
no difference (at least in the 3 first decimals) between the true and the estimated prob-
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Fig. 10. Estimation of the unconditional probabilities provided by LBP for the BAG in Fig. 5.(a)
abilities for nodes A-E and that, for node F , the marginal probability estimated with
LBP6 is 0.805while the true probability is 0.799. When evidence of attack is observed at
the Mail server (node D), shown in Fig. 5.(b), the LBP posterior probability estimates
match the exact probabilities. The reason for this exact result is that, given the evi-
dence of attack, D can be considered as a deterministic node. This splits the graph into
two tree structures with the remaining unobserved nodes: {A1, B} and {A2, C,E, F}
and the message passing scheme produces exact results for the two trees.
One of the drawbacks of LBP is that, in general, convergence is not guaranteed.
[Weiss 2000] show that LBP converges for graphs with a single loop and derives an
analytical relationship between LBP probability estimates and the true unconditional
probabilities. For more general graphs, [Mooij and Kappen 2005; Ihler et al. 2005]
present sufficient conditions on the convergence of LBP based on the concept of α-
contractions. However, applying the corresponding analysis is, in general, a difficult
task [Koller and Friedman 2009]. It is also important to note that convergence does not
mean correctness, i.e. LBP convergence does not imply that the unconditional proba-
bility estimates are accurate. However, the empirical study in [Murphy et al. 1999]
shows that usually, when LBP converges, the approximate marginal probabilities are
close to the exact values.
One simple way to favour convergence is to use damping. Hence, the update of the
messages from a variable node Xi to a factor fj have the form:
µˆ
(t)
Xi,fj
(Xi) = αµ
(t)
Xi,fj
(Xi) + (1− α)µ
(t−1)
fk ,Xi
(Xi) (15)
so that the damped message µˆ
(t)
Xi,fj
(Xi) is a convex combination of the message update
at iteration t and the message at iteration t − 1, where the damping factor α is a
positive value smaller than 1. The damped update for the messages from factors to
variable nodes is analogous. This technique can be applied for both S-LBP and P-LBP.
In Sect. 6, we analyse the effect of damping for the convergence and accuracy of LBP.
It is also possible to make LBP converge to a local minimum using double loop algo-
rithms [Yuille 2001; Welling and Teh 2001]. Unfortunately, these techniques are slow
and complicated and their accuracy is often worse than the standard LBP [Murphy
2012], since they are prone to converge to poor local minima. Similarly, other tech-
niques, such as the mean field approximation, have been proved to converge but are
usually less accurate than LBP, since the non-convexity of the mean field objective
function leads to poor solutions [Weiss 2001].
5. EXACT INFERENCE IN BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPHS: JUNCTION TREE
In this section we review the JT algorithm, the state-of-the-art technique for the static
and dynamic analysis of BAGs scaling to graphs with hundreds of nodes [Mun˜oz-
6In this case both S-LBP and P-LBP provide the same result.
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Fig. 11. Factor Graph representation for clique tree obtained from the BAG in Fig. 5.
Gonza´lez et al. 2016]. Although other exact inference techniques exist, as the Variable
Elimination (VE) proposed in [Liu and Man 2005], JT is computationally more efficient
than VE for the analysis of BAGs, as shown in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016]. In Sect. 6
we use JT as benchmark for the comparison with LBP.
The JT or clique tree algorithm is an extension of BP, for exact inference, that can be
applied on BNs or MRFs with a general structure. In this case, BP’s message scheme is
applied to a tree structure where the nodes represent clusters of the random variables
in the graph. Similar to [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016], we will describe the Shenoy-
Shafer method [Shenoy and Shafer 1990; Shafer and Shenoy 1990] method, which
uses the same message passing scheme as BP.
The first step of JT is to create a cluster graph with a tree structure from the initial
BN (or MRF). This cluster graph (or clique tree) can be considered an extension of
factor graphs with clusters of several random variables between two factors. In this
case, one random variable can appear in more than one cluster node. However, the
cluster graph needs to satisfy the running intersection property: if a random variable
Xi appears in two cluster nodes, Xi ∈ Cj and Xi ∈ Ck, then Xi also appears in each
cluster node in the unique path existing between Cj and Ck in the clique tree.
In the case of BNs, to create a clique tree we first need to moralize the graph, i.e.
make the graph undirected and add a link between the nodes that have a common child
(this step is not needed for MRFs). The moral graph is then triangulated to obtained
a chordal graph, i.e. one in which every minimal loop in the graph is of length three.
Each maximal clique in the chordal graph is a cluster node in the clique tree. As shown
in [Koller and Friedman 2009], we can create the cluster graph with the VE algorithm.
For the BAG example in Fig. 5, we show in Fig. 11 a factor graph representation of
the corresponding clique tree obtained using VE. For this factor graph representation,
the assignment of the different terms in (7) to the factors in Fig. 11 is:
f1(A1, B) = p(A1) p(B|A1)
f2(A2, C) = p(A2) p(C|A2)
f3(B,C,D) = p(D|B)
f4(C,D,E) = p(E|C)
f5(D,E, F ) = p(F |D,E)
(16)
With the factor graph representation of the clique tree we can calculate the uncon-
ditional probabilities using the same message passing scheme as in BP. The difference
is that, in this case, the scopes of the messages given in equations (10) and (11) depend
on multiple random variables rather than just one, as in the case of BP.
Once all the messages are computed, the unconditional joint probability for the vari-
ables in a cluster nodeXs (provided that the graph is a BN) is calculated as:
p(Xs) =
∏
fj∈Fs
µfj ,Xs(Xs) (17)
whereFs are the factor nodes in the neighbourhood of the cluster nodeXs. To calculate
the marginal probability for one random variableXi in the clusterXs, we just sum over
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the rest of the variables in Xs:
p(Xi) =
∑
Xj∈{Xs−Xi}
p(Xs) (18)
Evidence of compromise can be easily included when using JT, in the same way as
in BP. Further details can be found in [Koller and Friedman 2009]. The computational
complexity of JT is exponential in the scope of the biggest factor in the clique tree.
Concretely, if all the variables in the graph are discrete and have K possible values
each (in our case, K = 2), JT scales in time and space as O(|F |Ks), where |F | is the
number of factors and s is the size of the scope of the largest factor in the clique tree
(3 in the example in Fig. 11). Moreover, the computational complexity of applying VE
algorithm to build the clique tree is also exponential. This can limit the application
of JT for large graphs, although it depends on the structure of the graph, as we will
show in the experiments. The scalability for BP and LBP is similar to that of JT, i.e.
they scale in time and space as O(|F |Ks). However, since BP and LBP do not cluster
variables, the factors are usually smaller, so we expect to have smaller s.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present an experimental evaluation comparing the accuracy and
performance of sequential and parallel implementations of LBP with that of the JT
algorithm used in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016]. In detail, we first analyse the accuracy
of LBP when computing the unconditional and posterior probabilities for the static
and dynamic analysis of AGs, and then compare the time required to estimate these
probabilities with that required by JT. This allows us to determine if LBP is a suitable
alternative for tractable analysis of large AGs, and if the risk estimates are sufficiently
accurate to help administrators propose risk mitigation strategies.
For JT we have used VE to build the clique tree, selecting the elimination order-
ing according to the min-weight heuristic [Koller and Friedman 2009]. As shown in
[Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016], the elimination ordering has an impact on the perfor-
mance of the algorithm, reducing the memory required and the time to compute the
unconditional probabilities. For S-LBP and P-LBP we have used a tolerance threshold
of 10−3 for the convergence of the algorithm, i.e. we assume that the algorithm has
converged if the biggest change in the unconditional probabilities is less than 10−3. We
have used the Bayes Net toolbox for Matlab78 for all the algorithms.
6.1. Synthetic Attack Graph Generation
To provide a comprehensive evaluation with different graph sizes, network topologies,
and interdependencies, we have generated synthetic AGs in the experiments. Note
that, currently, there are no collections of AGs of similar variety obtained empirically
from real systems; in fact, no collections of empirically obtained AGs exist in the public
domain at all. Furthermore, from the examples reported in the literature it is hard to
determine the typical graph structure of AGs, e.g. for large corporate networks. We
expect these graph structures to vary significantly since they depend on the network
topology and the distribution and type of vulnerabilities across the network compo-
nents. For these, reasons, we have used the structures proposed in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez
et al. 2016] to generate the synthetic AGS: pseudo-random graphs and cluster graphs.
Note that despite the dependency of the AG on the network topology, the use of In-
ternet topology generators is not adequate to generate synthetic AGs, since they do
7https://github.com/bayesnet/bnt
8Our code implementation with the experiments for the BAG model can be found at http://rissgroup.org/
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Fig. 12. Example of random BAG with 20 nodes andm = 4.
not consider the security aspects of the network but only the topology. On the other
hand, Internet topologies can be fairly different to traditional corporate network de-
ployments.
The pseudo-random graphs are random DAGs where we only limit the maximum
number of parents that a node can have. This corresponds to restricting the maximum
number of vulnerabilities that can lead an attacker to reach a certain security condi-
tion. Since in most real scenarios there is some security in place, we expect to have
a reduced number of vulnerabilities that allows an attacker to compromise a network
node [WhiteHat Security 2015; Symantec 2015]. We consider that this assumption is
reasonable from a practical perspective. Thus, for each node in the graph Xi, we ran-
domly select its number of parents by drawing a random integer np in the interval
[1,m] uniformly, where m is the maximum number of possible parents allowed. Then,
we randomly select the np parent nodes for Xi from the set of nodes in the BAG for
which Xi is not a parent node already. This avoids directed cycles and preserves the
DAG structure. In Fig. 12 we show an example of a random BAG with 20 nodes and
m = 4. Since we are not assuming anything about the structure of the graph other
than the maximum in-degree of the nodes, there is no advantage for the inference al-
gorithms used in the experiments to reduce the computational complexity, i.e. these
graph structures can be representative of worse-case scenarios.
However, typical corporate networks are structured into subnetworks [Tan et al.
2003] and contain several hosts with common software installations so we can ex-
pect some form of cluster structure in the corresponding AG. Moreover, we expect a
reduced number of vulnerabilities allowing the attacker to escalate privileges across
different subnetworks. Routing and firewall rules between subnetworks usually hin-
der the progression of the attack. Then, the connectivity between subnetworks in the
AG is expected to be weak. This argument is in line with the AGs examples shown in
[Jajodia et al. 2011], where only attacks across subnetworks are considered. To gen-
erate this kind of graphs we have considered networks with clusters of the same size
nc. Then, for each cluster, following the same procedure as before, we have generated
pseudo-random subgraphs, limiting the maximum number of parents for each node to
m. Finally, to include the dependencies between clusters, we have added one edge from
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Fig. 13. Example of clustered BAG with 3 subnetworks and 10 nodes per subnetwork.
one node in each cluster to one node in each of the other clusters, provided that the
DAG structure required for BNs is preserved. For our experiments we have generated
synthetic clustered graphs with nc = 20 and 50, varying the total number of network
nodes from 100 to 1000. In Fig. 13 we show an example of a clustered BAG with 3
subnetworks, with 10 nodes per subnetwork, and m = 3.
The values for the probabilities of successful exploitation of vulnerabilities are
drawn at random from the distribution of CVSS scores extracted from [cvs 2016]. We
normalize the scores dividing them by 10. In Fig. 14 we show the distribution of CVSS
scores. The value of these probabilities can have an impact in the accuracy of the un-
conditional probability estimates, and in the convergence of the algorithms. Although
we think that the exploitability submetric of CVSS scores is a better indicator of the
difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability, it is difficult to get the distribution of this sub-
score, and so we have used the distribution of the whole CVSS score instead. Finally,
since we do not have data to estimate the error probability of the alert systems, and
their accuracy changes in time and with the topology of the network, we have consid-
ered in our experiments that the alert system does not trigger false alarms. For the
same reason, we do not also consider the possible presence of zero-day vulnerabilities.
In any case, these factors does not affect the computational complexity of the algo-
rithms used in the experiment, although the effect in the values of the unconditional
and posterior probabilities can be affected, as shown in Sect. 3.6 and Sect. 3.7.
For the experimental evaluation we start analysing the accuracy, convergence, and
scalability of S-LBP and P-LBP for the pseudo-random AGs. Then, following a similar
treatment we present the experimental results on cluster AGs.
6.2. BAGs with pseudo-random structure
6.2.1. Accuracy and Convergence. In our first experiment we want to measure the accu-
racy and the convergence of both S-LBP and P-LBP for pseudo-random AGs. We have
therefore generated synthetic AGs with 40 nodes and m = 3, where we have varied
the proportion of OR and AND conditional probability tables. We have also explored
different values for the damping factor α in the range [0, 0.5]. We have measured the
accuracy using the Rooted Mean Squared Error (RMSE), comparing LBP estimates
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Fig. 14. Distribution of the CVSS scores [cvs 2016].
Table III. Average RMSE plus/minus one standard deviation for P-LBP on pseudo-random
BAGs with m = 3 and 40 nodes varying the damping factor α and the probability of having
AND-type conditional probability tables, p(AND).
p(AND) α = 0.0 α = 0.1 α = 0.3 α = 0.5
0.0 0.0315 ± 0.0223 0.0272 ± 0.0187 0.0291 ± 0.0194 0.0266 ± 0.0175
0.2 0.0218 ± 0.0141 0.0222 ± 0.0143 0.0266 ± 0.0206 0.0276 ± 0.0183
0.5 0.0182 ± 0.0103 0.0150 ± 0.0067 0.0165 ± 0.0123 0.0175 ± 0.0083
0.8 0.0081 ± 0.0069 0.0108 ± 0.0097 0.0131 ± 0.0100 0.0112 ± 0.0064
1.0 0.0081 ± 0.0058 0.0069 ± 0.0047 0.0107 ± 0.0096 0.0089 ± 0.0085
with the exact unconditional probabilities provided by JT. For each combination of pa-
rameters explored we have averaged the RMSE obtained for 20 independent BAGs.
From the results in Tab. III we observe that the RMSE is less than 0.03 in most cases,
which is a reasonable accuracy to estimate the risks of compromising the different
nodes in the AG, especially when considering that the probabilities of successful ex-
ploitation of vulnerabilities are not accurate, since they are estimated with the CVSS
scores. Thus, the accuracy of LBP is enough to allow system administrators to decide
the actions that need to be taken (both for the static and the dynamic analysis of the
network). It is also interesting to observe that a little bit of damping, i.e. small values
of α, slightly improve the accuracy. Furthermore, it is remarkable that the RMSE is
lower when the proportion of AND-type conditional probability tables is higher. This
effect is due to the different coupling effect between the variables in the loops of the
BAG depending on the type of conditional probability table. In Tab. III we only show
the RMSE for P-LBP, since the differences w.r.t. S-LBP were negligible. Moreover, we
have also observed that both implementations of LBP converged in all cases.
6.2.2. Accuracy with the Number of Iterations. In our second experiment we have analysed
how the accuracy of the LBP probability estimates changes with the number of iter-
ations. LBP allows to monitor the intermediate estimates of the unconditional proba-
bilities, which is not possible with JT. This can help system administrators to reduce
the response time to an attack, since they do not need to wait until the algorithm has
completely converged.
In Fig. 15 we show the average RMSE of P-LBP and S-LBP as a function of the
number of iterations for 25 pseudo-random BAGs with 100 nodes and m = 3. The
probability of having AND-type conditional probability tables has been set to 0.5, and
we have used a damping factor of α = 0.2 in both LBP implementations. From the
results in Fig. 15 we can observe that the algorithms converge on average in less than
15 iterations, although P-LBP seems to converge faster, and gets better estimates of the
unconditional probabilities after the first iteration (although the final result is similar
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Fig. 15. Average RMSE of P-LBP and S-LBP with the number of iterations for 25 pseudo-random BAGs
with 100 nodes andm = 3.
to S-LBP). From Fig. 15 it is important to note that, after 5 iterations, the RMSE for
P-LBP is about 0.05. This accuracy can be considered reasonable to start planning risk
mitigation strategies at run-time without waiting for LBP to converge.
6.2.3. Time Scalability. Our last experiment with pseudo-random BAGs is aimed at
evaluating the time scalability of LBP and JT for the static and dynamic analysis
of AGs. We have analysed networks with different sizes and different densities: For m
we have explored the values 3 and 4, while for n, the number of nodes in the BAG, we
have used values in the range [20, 3000]. However, for JT we have limited the value of
n to 120 for m = 3 and to 80 for m = 4 because of physical memory limitations9. The
probability of having AND-type conditional probability tables is set to 0.5. For each
value of n and m we have generated 20 pseudo-random BAGs and, for each BAG, we
compute the unconditional probabilities for all the nodes with both LBP and JT.
In Fig. 16 we show the average time required to compute the unconditional proba-
bilities for all the nodes in the BAG for P-LBP, S-LBP, and JT. In the case of JT, the
measured time includes the time required to build the clique tree, and compute all
the messages and all the unconditional probabilities. For LBP, this time considers the
computation of all the messages and the probability estimates. Therefore, we are, in
essence, measuring the time required to perform the static analysis of the BAG. For
both LBP variants we use α = 0.2 and set the maximum number of iterations to two
times the number of nodes in the graph. As in the previous experiment, both LBP
implementations converged in all cases.
From the results shown in Fig. 16.(a) we can observe the exponential increase of JT
with the number of nodes, whereas both P-LBP and S-LBP scale linearly. Although
the time to compute the unconditional probabilities by JT is lower for small AGs (less
than 100 nodes), it appears that LBP is a suitable alternative to make inference in
large BAGs, where the exponential scalability of JT makes its use impractical. It is
also interesting to note that P-LBP is faster than S-LBP. Moreover, when increasing
the complexity of the network (by increasing m) the performance of P-LBP remains
similar, whereas we can observe larger differences for S-LBP.
For the dynamic analysis of AGs, when we observe evidence of compromise in some
nodes, we need to recompute all the messages taking into account the evidence as well
as the posterior probabilities in all the graph nodes. This applies both to JT and LBP.
However, for JT, we do not need to build the clique tree again. So, to analyse the perfor-
mance of the algorithms for the dynamic analysis of AGs, we have randomly selected
3 nodes in each graph where we consider that evidence of attack has been observed.
9The experiments have been conducted in a 16 GB computer with an Intel Core i7 processor at 3.40 GHz.
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Fig. 16. (a) Average time to compute the unconditional probabilities for P-LBP, S-LBP, and JT for pseudo-
random attack graphs. (b) Extended results for P-LBP and S-LBP for BAGs up to 3000 nodes. The notation
P-LBP-m, S-LBP-m, and JT-m stands for the value of m, the maximum number of parents allowed for each
node, used to generate the graphs in each case.
Then, we have measured the time required to recompute the posterior probabilities
for P-LBP, S-LBP, and JT. We have omitted the resulting figure, since the results are
very similar to those obtained for the static analysis (in Fig. 16). The measured times
for the dynamic analysis are slightly lower for all the methods and the differences
are not very significant. In the case of the JT, this means that for this kind of graphs
the bottleneck of the algorithm is the computation of the messages rather than the
time required to build the clique tree [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2016]. This is due to the
strong interconnection of the nodes in the graph, which makes some clusters in the
clique tree to have a high number of variables. For LBP implementations, the similar-
ity of the results suggests that the number of iterations needed to converge are similar.
In Fig. 16.(b) we show the extended experiments for LBP using pseudo-random BAGs
up to 3000 nodes. We observe that for both LBP implementations linear scalability still
holds. The linear scalability of LBP for this kind of graphs make it useful for both static
and dynamic analysis of AGs, especially when the graphs are large. It is thus possible
to analyse AGs with thousands of nodes, which can correspond to networks with tens
or hundreds of thousands of nodes (depending on the number of vulnerabilities).
6.3. BAGs with cluster structure
6.3.1. Accuracy and Convergence. For this experiment we have generated synthetic
cluster AGs with 5 clusters with nc = 20 nodes per cluster andm = 3. As for the pseudo-
random BAGs, we have varied the proportion of OR and AND conditional probability
tables and we have explored values for the damping factor α in the range [0, 0.5]. For
each combination of parameters explored we have averaged the RMSE obtained for
20 independent BAGs. The results are shown in Tab. IV, where we observe that the
average RMSE is less than 0.04 in all cases, which means that the probability esti-
mates provided by LBP are reasonable to perform risk assessment with BAGs. We can
also appreciate that the proportion of AND/OR conditional probability tables has some
impact on the accuracy of the probability estimates. Thus, having a bigger proportion
of AND-type conditional probability tables results in more accurate estimates. In this
case, in contrast to the results shown in Tab. III, damping does not provide any clear
improvement in the accuracy. However, even in these cases, it is a good practice to
include a little bit of damping in LBP updates to avoid potential instabilities in the
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Table IV. Average RMSE plus/minus one standard deviation for P-LBP on clustered BAGs
with m = 3, 5 subnetworks and nc = 20 nodes per subnetwork, varying the damping factor
α and the probability of having AND-type conditional probability tables, p(AND).
p(AND) α = 0.0 α = 0.1 α = 0.3 α = 0.5
0.0 0.0342± 0.0213 0.0376± 0.0213 0.0341± 0.0157 0.0337± 0.0186
0.2 0.0216± 0.0078 0.0247± 0.0105 0.0289± 0.0154 0.0229± 0.0123
0.5 0.0185± 0.0062 0.0219± 0.0128 0.0193± 0.0083 0.0224± 0.0091
0.8 0.0149± 0.0042 0.0136± 0.0035 0.0138± 0.0078 0.0127± 0.0053
1.0 0.0109± 0.0042 0.0115± 0.0039 0.0093± 0.0043 0.0107± 0.0038
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
P-LBP
S-LBP
Iterations
R
M
S
E
Fig. 17. Average RMSE of P-LBP and S-LBP with the number of iterations for 25 cluster BAGs with 100
nodes (5 subnetworks with 20 nodes per subnetwork) andm = 3.
algorithm. As in the case of the pseudo-random BAGs, we only show the RMSE for
P-LBP, since the results obtained from S-LBP are very similar. Finally, we have also
observed that both, P-LBP and S-LBP, converged in all cases.
6.3.2. Accuracy with the Number of Iterations. In Fig. 17 we show how the average RMSE
of P-LBP and S-LBP decreases with the number of iterations. For these experiments
we have generated 25 cluster BAGs with 5 clusters and nc = 20 nodes per cluster,
with m = 3. As in the case of the pseudo-random BAGs, we have set the probability
of having AND-type conditional probability tables to 0.5 and we have used a damping
factor of α = 0.2.
The results in Fig. 17 are very similar to those shown in Fig. 15 for the case of the
pseudo-random BAGs. Thus, we can observe that after 4 iterations, P-LBP produce
estimates for the unconditional probabilities with an average RMSE less than 0.05.
We also appreciate that, as in the previous case, P-LBP converges faster than S-LBP,
although both techniques achieve a similar approximation error after convergence.
The result of this experiment shows that, after a few iterations, the accuracy provided
by LBP can be considered reasonable to start planning risk mitigation strategies at
run-time before LBP converges.
6.3.3. Time Scalability. We report in Fig. 18.(a) the time required to perform the static
analysis for P-LBP, S-LBP, and JT. As in the case of the pseudo-random networks we
observe that JT scales exponentially with the number of nodes, although it is able to
perform static analysis on larger networks (compared to the pseudo-random AGs). In
contrast, both LBP implementations scale linearly with the number of nodes in the
BAG, and require less time than JT to compute all the unconditional probabilities for
graphs with more than 500 nodes. Also in line with the previous experiment, P-LBP
shows a better performance than S-LBP, although the difference is not as significant as
before. We can also appreciate that, for both LBP methods, the increment on the size of
the clusters implies only a small difference in the time performance of the algorithms.
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Fig. 18. Time to compute the unconditional probabilities for P-LBP, S-LBP, and the JT algorithm for cluster
networks with different cluster sizes (nc = 20 and 50) and m = 3 for: (a) the static analysis and (b) the
dynamic analysis (when we observe evidence of attack at 3 random nodes).
In Fig. 18.(b) we show the time required to perform the dynamic analysis when we
observe evidence of attack in 3 nodes chosen at random. We can observe again that
the scalability for both LBP implementations is linear in the number of nodes, and
that the time required to compute all the unconditional probabilities in the BAG is
slightly lower than in the case of the static analysis in Fig. 18.(a). However, in this
case the performance of JT is also linear in the number of nodes and the time required
to compute the unconditional probabilities is much lower than in the case of two LBP
methods.
These results indicate that, when JT is applied on clustered networks, the bottleneck
is the generation of the clique tree, while the computation of the messages is simple.
This suggests that the cluster structure of the BAGs produces clique trees with a re-
duced number of variables in each cluster of the tree. Hence, the messages sent across
nodes involve a reduced number of random variables, allowing a fast calculation of
the posterior probabilities for the dynamic analysis of the BAGs. In the case of LBP,
the messages are simpler than in the case of JT. However, the time to compute the
unconditional probabilities in the dynamic analysis is higher since, at each iteration,
we need to compute all the messages and several iterations are needed to make the
algorithm converge. Although JT is faster than LBP for the dynamic analysis of clus-
tered BAGs, the exponential scalability for the static analysis, when the clique tree is
generated, limits the tractability of the analysis for large networks. On the other hand,
as mentioned before, LBP allows to monitor the values of the posterior probabilities at
each iteration, so that we can obtain accurate estimates for the probabilities before the
algorithm converges.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Bayesian Networks are a powerful tool for the static and dynamic analysis of AGs: the
unconditional probabilities at each node in the graph (not only for the target) provide
useful information to system administrators for security risk assessment and mitiga-
tion. The values of these probabilities take into account the dependencies between the
different attack paths and the difficulty of exploiting each vulnerability, in contrast to
other measures proposed in the literature to perform risk assessment in AGs. However,
the scalability problems of the exact inference techniques proposed in the literature for
the static and dynamic analysis of BAGs limit the applicability of these techniques to
graphs with a few hundreds of nodes, far from the size of the AGs we can expect in
large corporate networks.
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In this paper we have shown that LBP, an approximate inference technique, can
be used effectively for the static and dynamic analysis of large BAGs. We have ver-
ified through experiments that the reduction in the computational cost and memory
requirements is significant. Moreover our experimental evaluation shows that LBP
scales linearly with the number of nodes for both the static and the dynamic analysis.
Overall these results show significantly better performance than the techniques pro-
posed for the analysis of BAGs in the literature so far. We have experimented with
synthetic AGs with a broad variety of topologies in an effort to ensure the applicability
of the technique to many network deployments. The gains in scalability are obtained
at the price of a loss in accuracy on the probabilities. We have however verified through
experiments that this accuracy loss is very low with an average RMSE of less than 0.03,
especially taking into account that the values for the probability of successful exploita-
tion of the vulnerabilities, used to build the BAG models, are non-accurate estimates.
We have also shown through the experiments that LBP compares favourably with the
JT, the state of the art technique for exact inference in BAGs [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al.
2016]. Although a significant amount of literature on the application of AG exists,
few studies have considered the computational aspect of making inference on them.
Furthermore, the lack of scalability has significantly hindered their application. Our
results show that by using the right techniques, both static an dynamic analysis can
be performed on AGs with thousands of nodes, even on a standard laptop computer.
We have also evaluated the effect of clustering on the performance of the analysis
and shown that this can lead to further significant gains in performance. Different
approaches to allow for tractable analysis of AGs can include lower resolution repre-
sentations of the AG, by for example representing similar security conditions (from
similar network nodes) as a single node. High level abstractions of the original AG can
also be considered, similar to the framework proposed by [Noel and Jajodia 2004] to
manage AG complexity for visualization. These approaches applied to risk assessment
induce a trade-off between the accuracy, the level of resolution, and the tractability of
the analysis. However, the estimation of the risks associated to these aggregated nodes
requires special consideration.
Our future research plans include modelling the attacker’s capabilities to estimate
the probability of successful exploitation of vulnerabilities, and the use of Bayesian
inference techniques to help prioritizing forensic investigation using AGs.
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